The lecture takes up the title’s provocation (can robots, in any meaningful sense, be the bearers of human rights?) and works through the doctrinal architecture that makes the question hard. The opening block reads the main human-rights instruments (the Universal Declaration, the ICCPR and ICESCR, the ECHR) as anthropocentric by design: the human is the explicit subject, and the dignity-based grounding presupposes capacities (sentience, agency, vulnerability) that machines do not possess. The substantive middle puts that anthropocentrism under pressure through three comparative cases: the long historical expansion of who counts as a rights-bearer (from male propertied citizens outward to women, children, minorities, refugees, and people with disabilities); the campaigns for non-human personhood that have been pursued around great apes, cetaceans, and natural objects such as rivers; and corporate personhood as a counter-example of legal personhood unanchored from biological consciousness. The closing block sets out the almost people framework developed in doctoral research at Maynooth University, which approaches social robots not as candidates for personhood but as participants in a structured balancing of the legal interests at stake when robots enter human social spaces, and asks whether that frame can be re-tooled to do work in human-rights doctrine, or whether a parallel category of protection, neither rights nor property, better fits the case.
The follow-up seminar is planned around two anchor moments. The first is the European Parliament’s 2017 Resolution on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, the proposal of ‘electronic personhood’ it floated, and the 2018 Open Letter from 156 AI and law experts that pushed back against any such category. The second is the figure of Sophia, the Hanson Robotics humanoid granted Saudi Arabian citizenship in 2017, read as a study in the gap between symbolic gesture and legal substance. Students will work through both against the framework the lecture sets out.