A complete bibliography.

Robots, which were seen as gimmicks in science fiction stories until not so long ago, have already crossed into reality. Thanks to the ever-growing autonomy of robots and ever-expanding variety of roles assigned to them, they are becoming more integrated into the ordinary course of everyday life. With the advent of social robots that can engage human beings on personal levels, for the first time, non-human entities are emerging as social interaction partners. In that regard, from the legal perspective, it is no longer possible to treat them as mere tools.

The autonomy of robots is expected to have significant impacts on various interests recognised by the legal principles that underlie existing legal instruments. However, almost none of the existing legal instruments were developed in consideration of the implications of robots’ emerging roles as independent social actors. On explaining the inadequacy of existing legal instruments, I outline the prospect of a paradigm shift in the law’s approach to human-robot social interactions.

A comparative analysis of German, Italian, and Irish legal systems — selected to represent the EU’s diverse legal families — demonstrates that robots’ autonomous behaviours and emerging roles as social interaction partners are likely to undermine the legal principles expressed most notably in the domains of private law (contract law and tort law) and criminal law. The conceptual deconstruction of existing legal instruments offered by these domains reveals that legal systems overlook the characteristics of social robots that set them apart from other artefacts, namely, their relative autonomy and social agency. These distinctive characteristics allow robots to perform unpredictable behaviours and to prompt human beings they interact with to anthropomorphise them. Overlooking these characteristics diminishes the adequacy of existing legal instruments. Ultimately, I conclude that the shortcomings of contemporary legal systems can be overcome by creating a new, unified legal framework that would enable the law to respond to the legal implications of robot autonomy and the phenomenon of robot anthropomorphism.

This study critically depicts the position on culpa in contrahendo in the European Private International Law. This critical description is based on the conceptual analysis of culpa in contrahendo. In this context, first, the conceptual elements and the legal character of culpa in contrahendo have been determined in consideration of the differences between the national legal systems and more broadly between the two main legal traditions (Common law and Civil law traditions), and hence, the rules on the determination of the competent court and applicable law in the European Private International Law have been analysed in this respect.

The elements of culpa in contrahendo liability are the presence of the contract negotiations, breach of the pre-contractual duty of good faith, fault, damages, and causation-at-fact. The recognition and legal situation of the pre-contractual duty of good faith is the main point of divergence between different legal systems: in Common law systems the duty is not recognised and therefore its breach is not sanctioned, whereas in most Civil law systems the duty is sanctioned. Nonetheless, the breach of the pre-contractual duty of good faith is being compensated under the institutions of promissory estoppel and misrepresentation in the Common law legal systems, albeit these institutions have more specific elements than those for the liability for culpa in contrahendo.

Liability for culpa in contrahendo exists in most legal systems with varying scopes and names, and its legal characterisation differs in every national legal system. The most plausible characterisation defines culpa in contrahendo as a fiduciary liability arising from a breach of a special proximity between the parties, and applies contractual liability provisions in the absence of provisions specific to that responsibility — though different legal systems prefer to define it as a contractual or tort liability (France) or by adopting case-by-case characterisation (Portugal, UK, Ireland). Evaluating the European Private International Law rules under the light of this analysis, it has, in its step-by-step development, accordingly categorised culpa in contrahendo as a non-contractual liability, but determined the applicable law as the law applicable to the contract that has been negotiated. The European Private International Law does not acknowledge or reject the pre-contractual duty of good faith, regarding the differences between Common law and Civil law systems.

Maritime decarbonization is not only a technical task; it is also a governance challenge. This chapter argues that decarbonization measures are more likely to be durable when those most affected can meaningfully influence how the transition is shaped. It first outlines the legal framework for regulating shipping emissions under UNCLOS, the international climate regime, and the IMO’s work through MARPOL Annex VI. It then examines power imbalances in IMO decision-making, where seafarers, port and coastal communities, and many Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) remain under-represented. The IMO’s Regulatory Scoping Exercise on Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) is used to show how limited capacity can translate into limited influence. The chapter also argues that fragmentation between environmental, labor, and human rights regimes leaves ‘just transition’ concerns weakly institutionalized in maritime governance. Drawing on examples from the EU and selected national approaches, it shows that more participatory models are possible and may support implementation. Finally, it examines how autonomous shipping and AI challenge core assumptions of maritime law, including rules built around a human master and lookout and liability frameworks that rely on clear standards of foreseeability and causation. The chapter concludes by identifying reform pathways toward more transparent and people-centered maritime decarbonization governance.

Maritime decarbonisation is often framed as a techno-economic challenge, with most efforts toward a green future focusing on reducing the sector’s carbon output. There is no shortage of innovation in this regard, and the drive to make the transition happen is strong: the process demands the development of cleaner fuel alternatives and the advancement of propulsion system engineering, complemented by economic incentives, like the formulation of emissions standards or the establishment of pricing mechanisms. The framing is foundational, but it does not quite capture the whole picture. It focuses on technology and business; while, like all global industries, the maritime sector stands on the shoulders of people who perform the work and are most affected by structural changes. If the transition is going to last, it needs to account for its effects on people and communities. Nonetheless, the existing literature has not adequately addressed the interplay between climate policy and social equity. The works in this book aim to fill this gap in the literature by offering perspectives on maritime decarbonisation from the viewpoint of people, through the lens of climate justice. One recurring theme is that maritime decarbonisation is profoundly human.

In simple terms, Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (hereinafter MASS) refer to vessels that can self-execute some or all of their operational processes on their own. The display of autonomy, i.e., the characteristic that differentiates MASS from the rest of the ships, lays a specific spectrum. Presently, there are MASS, specifically short-distance passenger ferries, that perform some of the operational tasks autonomously. Although the level of technological development allows the production of such ships, there are no commercial oceangoing MASS that are capable of self-navigation. Still, as the combined initial and working costs of MASS become relatively inexpensive compared to the constantly increasing costs associated with running crewed vessels, facilitated by the constantly decreasing numbers of available seafarers worldwide, it is assessed that MASS will emerge and become widespread, perhaps sooner than anticipated. Nonetheless, just as the core domains of private law fail to recognise that some functional artefacts could make decisions and implement them without human intervention — the legal regime that governs the operations of ships is based on the presumption that ships are either operated by crews on board or somehow under human control. That being the case, determining how the legal regime should respond to the unwelcome outcomes of MASS’ independent activities is critical for preserving the principles of legal security and certainty, two of the core principles of the rule of law.

An important area of application of robotics technologies is unmanned water surface and underwater vehicles, such as in remote exploration work, maritime transportation, repairs of oil rigs and so on. This study evaluates the consequences of these technologies, particularly in a liability context. Taking into account the characteristics of vehicles mentioned above, especially autonomy, it is expected that development of these vehicles, and their increased use in the civil sector, is likely to require a new approach other than the well-established fault-based liability regime. Still, these autonomous vessels are not expected to require amendments to the basic tenets of maritime law as illustrated in, for instance, the 1972 IMO COLREGs Convention. In the light of contemporary applications, it is submitted that most unmanned water surface and underwater vehicles are becoming more and more autonomous, and they are closer to reasonable safety when compared to the ultra-hazardous activity of unmanned aerial vehicles. Safety being the keyword, this chapter argues that the liability regime that applies to unmanned marine vessels should not only conform to the technical characteristics of these vehicles but also balance the social interest in technological progress with the interest of general security and the freedom of commercial enterprise. Indeed, the liability regime to be applied to marine vessels should respond to similar needs with the regime to be applied to robots. A balanced and consistent liability regime is essential for the economic viability of maritime sectors, especially maritime transport, and the economic viability is a prerequisite for sustainability. Moreover, long-term sustainability concerns make it unreasonable to altogether refuse technological innovation, which has many advantages in terms of environmental protection and resource management. To that end, the present study focuses its analysis on the EU law.

Human-robot interactions are inherently different from interactions with other artefacts, as robots are autonomous. Furthermore, recent technological advances have also enabled robots to undertake roles that are formerly thought to be reserved for humans, e.g. as companions or lovers, since interactive abilities of robots and their autonomy are sufficient to evoke an automatic cognitive response — robot anthropomorphism. Robot anthropomorphism, the attribution of human attitudes and emotions to robots, implies that behaviours towards robots may have implications for individuals and society in the long term. Examples include manipulation of emotional attachments to robots and increase in existing privacy risks. To respond to these implications, legal orders must acknowledge that robots are no longer mere tools of human interactions, but instead parties to such interactions. This paper examines the unique implications on law and society presented by sociable robots, anthropomorphic machines by design. First, the phenomenon of robot anthropomorphism and its effects, and then, the risks presented by the sociable robots are addressed. As such, this chapter lays out the foundation for the examination of both the legal problems arising from the autonomy of robots, and the recommendations regarding the solution of these problems.

A jointly authored set of comments and recommendations on the Geological Survey of Sweden’s 2025 interim report on regulatory obstacles to geological CO₂ storage. The submission addresses obstacles in seven thematic areas: institutional framework and supervisory responsibility (lead authority, transport oversight, permit integration); international law and cross-border cooperation (Sweden’s position under the Helsinki Convention; alignment between the HELCOM and OSPAR regimes; standardised bilateral agreements); EU law alignment and implementation (NZIA mechanisms, CO₂ stream composition, End-of-Waste criteria, the onshore-storage ban, ETS leakage liability); planning, property, and land use (national-interest designation, statutory easement rights for plume migration); liability, insurance, and insolvency; carbon credits, model contracts, and pipeline economic regulation; and national security.

The report addresses the regulatory gap that has opened up between AI use in the Turkish energy sector — already widespread in grid-management optimisation, fault prediction, demand forecasting, dynamic pricing, and renewable-energy integration — and the existing legislative framework, which does not respond to the distinctive features of AI systems. The principal risks identified are: safety (algorithmic errors that can cascade into large-scale outages, cyber-vulnerabilities exposed by AI components, system failures affecting critical infrastructure); transparency and consumer rights (opaque automated decision-making); the protection of personal data at scale; discriminatory algorithms; and the unsettled liability regime in a multi-actor AI ecosystem.

Reading the existing Turkish legal landscape against the EU framework — the AI Act, the revised Product Liability Directive (2024/2853), and the GDPR — the report finds the domestic provisions insufficient and proposes a draft secondary regulation for AI deployment by energy distribution companies, addressing each of the risk categories above and the procedural duties of providers and deployers under the EU AI Act.

The report sets out the six strategies of the projected Turkish AI ecosystem for electricity distribution — reliable and effective data management; technology and infrastructure to prevent resource waste; qualified AI workforce; research and development; trustworthy AI deployment via regulation; ecosystem formation — together with their sub-objectives, and maps each sub-objective to the article of a proposed secondary regulation for AI in the energy sector that would address it (or marks it regulation not required where appropriate).

The mapping covers data classification and security, open data publication, cross-sector data sharing, AI asset inventory and monitoring, AI maturity assessment for sector stakeholders, and open-source AI technologies, and is designed as a structural compliance check on whether the draft secondary regulation in fact responds to every strategic objective the AI ecosystem has set itself.

An essay on the moral and legal status of saviour children — children conceived through pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and HLA typing in order to provide compatible tissue or cells to an existing sibling. The essay reads the issue across bioethical, philosophical, and legal frames, working through the literature on PGD as a therapeutic technology, the instrumentalisation objection that Kantian ethics raises against creating a child as a means to another’s end, and the competing arguments from autonomy, parental motivation, and the welfare of the saviour child.

An undergraduate-period essay on the notion of justice (adalet anlayışı) in Ancient Egypt, written for the Bilkent University Law Career Club’s journal Sine Qua Non. Drawing on Egyptological scholarship from Halman, Budge, and Yavi alongside the British Museum’s Papyrus of Ani, the essay treats Ma’at — the principle of truth, balance, order, law, ethics, and justice, and the goddess who personifies them — as the ordering frame for both pharaonic governance and the religious cosmology that runs from this world into the afterlife.

The pharaoh, identified with the state to the point that the language did not separate the words for ‘government’, ‘pharaoh’, and ‘state’, is bound to follow Ma’at as principle and to honour her as goddess. The court system reflects the same idea: the chief justice is recognised as ‘priest of Ma’at’, and the presiding judge wears her ostrich-feather symbol, transferred at the close of trial to the side that has been shown to be in the right. The closing argument is that Ancient Egypt internalised justice to a degree unusual among contemporary civilisations: even its harshest gods are presented as watchers over balance and equity, and its weighing-of-the-heart judgment in the afterlife — heart against feather — places the moral measure of a person above the political fortune of their birth.